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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years, the United States Constitution mandates that a 
census be taken to determine the population of the entire country.1  
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 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned 
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .  
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the 
Congress . . . and within every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”). 
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Although the data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau is used for a 
multitude of reasons,2 the primary, constitutionally mandated 
purpose for the census is to apportion the 435 seats of the U.S. 
House of Representatives between the states.3  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted Article I, Section 2 to require that each 
congressional district be equal in population.4  Thus, if it is 
determined that a state’s congressional districts are not equal, the 
state must redraw its districts to meet the equal population 
requirement.5  Most states also use the census numbers to 
determine the make-up of their own state legislatures,6 and thus, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state legislative districts must 
also be of roughly equal populations.7 
Because of these requirements, each state must determine how 
many people live in its legislative and congressional districts every 
ten years.8  If a state’s districts are not of equal populations, the 
state is mandated to redraw its district lines in order to conform 
with the Constitution’s requirement of equal representation.  This 
 
 2.  See The Constitution, the Congress and the Census: Representation and 
Reapportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 14, 2010, 1:38:53 PM), 
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/dropin7.htm (“Community leaders use the 
census for everything from planning schools and building roads to providing 
recreational opportunities and managing health care services.”). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see The Constitution, the Congress and the Census, 
supra note 2. 
 4.  The plain objective of Article I, Section 2 is to make “equal 
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House 
of Representatives.”  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).  The “equal 
representation” standard requires that congressional districts achieve population 
equality “as nearly as is practicable.”  Id. at 7–8.  The “as nearly as is practicable” 
standard requires that “the state make a good-faith effort to achieve precise 
mathematical equality.”  Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969).  
Therefore, the Constitution only permits “the limited population variances which 
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for 
which justification is shown.”  Id. at 531. 
 5.  See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8 (holding that the Constitution requires that 
one man’s vote in a congressional election must be worth as much as another’s); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 6.  See The Constitution, the Congress and the Census, supra note 2. 
 7.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“The Equal Protection 
Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for 
all citizens . . . .  [T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both 
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population 
basis.”). 
 8.  A legislative district refers to the territory that each state legislator 
represents, while a congressional district refers to the territory that each member 
of the United States House of Representatives represents. 
2
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process, known as “redistricting,” has become a very heated and 
political debate as politicians and civic leaders attempt to control 
the process in order to draw maximally beneficial maps for their 
respective parties.9 
In Minnesota, and in most states around the country, the state 
legislature is charged with the responsibility of redrawing both the 
congressional and the legislative districts every ten years.10  If the 
legislature is unable to come to an agreement on an appropriate 
redistricting plan, the task of redistricting falls on the shoulders of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.11  Because the state legislature has 
failed to enact acceptable redistricting maps in recent memory12—
leaving the courts to decide this controversial and political issue for 
Minnesotans every ten years—questions arise as to whether 
Minnesota’s redistricting method is really the most effective and 
efficient way.  While most states use a method of redistricting that 
mirrors Minnesota’s, opponents of the method argue that 
redistricting is an inherently political process and should not be 
done by the same legislators that stand to benefit from it.  They also 
argue that this political process directly conflicts with the judiciary’s 
role as a politically neutral entity.13 
While these arguments do have some merit, the fact that 
Minnesota’s judiciary has redistricted the state over the past few 
census cycles does not imply that Minnesota’s system must be 
completely reformed.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has encouraged 
 
 9.  See Tim Pugmire, Control over Redistricting, ‘a Secret Perk,’ at Stake in Election, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Oct. 1, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display 
/web/2010/10/01/redistricting (“[M]any incumbent legislators view redistricting 
as a secret perk . . . [and] ‘it is entirely based on each party trying to maximize the 
number of districts that tilt in their direction.’” (quoting Larry Jacobs, political 
science professor, University of Minnesota)). 
 10.  MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[T]he legislature shall have the power to 
prescribe the bounds of congressional and legislative districts.”). 
 11.  See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (“The Minnesota Special 
Redistricting Panel’s issuance of its [redistricting] plan (conditioned on the 
legislature’s failure to enact a constitutionally acceptable plan in January) . . . was 
precisely the sort of state judicial supervision of redistricting we have 
encouraged.”). 
 12.  See Peter S. Wattson, History of Minnesota Redistricting, MINN.  LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.gis.leg.mn/html/redist-hist.pdf (last updated July 7, 2010, 12:49 PM).  
The last time the state legislature passed a constitutionally sound legislative 
redistricting plan was in 1966.  Id. at 2.  Since the 1970 census, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has had to adopt its own maps for legislative redistricting.  Id. at 3–
5. 
 13.  See Thomas J. Kalitowski & Elizabeth M. Brama, Should Judges Get Out of 
Redistricting?, BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 2004, at 19, 19. 
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this type of judicial supervision over redistricting.14  Therefore, the 
fact that the Minnesota legislature has not been able to promulgate 
redistricting maps in recent years does not indicate that 
Minnesota’s method should simply be abandoned.  This is not to 
say, however, that some reforms are unnecessary.  By implementing 
statutory, politically neutral standards that both the legislature and 
the judiciary must adhere to when redistricting, much of the 
politics that plagues the process can be greatly reduced.  These 
reforms remove some of the biases that critics are wary of while 
allowing the responsibility of redistricting to remain with the 
legislature—the branch of government elected to make decisions 
in the best interest of the public.  Also, by promulgating these 
standards, the legislature is still able to play a role in the process, 
even if the task of redistricting ultimately falls on the courts. 
This note initially provides an overview of Minnesota’s 
redistricting method, using the 2010 redistricting battle as an 
illustrative demonstration of the process.15  This overview is 
followed by a discussion of the most common problems and 
criticisms of the way Minnesota redistricts.16  Minnesota’s method is 
not the only way for a state to redistrict, and examples of two 
alternative processes are surveyed in Part IV.17  This note concludes 
with an analysis of the advantages, disadvantages, and effectiveness 
of the different methods,18 and advocates that while Minnesota 
should remain cautious about a complete overhaul of the 
redistricting process, it should consider reforming its current 
method by implementing statutorily defined redistricting standards 
to be applied by both the legislature and the judiciary.19 
II. THE MINNESOTA METHOD 
The Minnesota Constitution states, “At its first session after 
each enumeration of the inhabitants of this state . . . the legislature 
shall have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional and 
legislative districts.”20  In other words, Minnesota gives the power to 
redistrict to the legislative branch.  The legislature performs this 
 
 14.  Growe, 507 U.S. at 34. 
 15.  See infra Part II. 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
 18.  See infra Part V. 
 19.  See infra Part VI. 
 20.  MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
4
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responsibility through the traditional legislative process—a bill 
enunciating the redistricting plan is passed by each house of the 
legislature and becomes law after being signed by the governor.21  
Redistricting must be completed no later than twenty-five weeks 
before the state primary election in the second year of each 
decade,22 and if the legislature and the governor are unable to 
agree on a plan, the responsibility of drawing constitutionally 
sound districts falls on the state judicial branch.23 
In early March 2010, census forms were delivered to every 
household throughout the United States.24  By December 21, 2010, 
the U.S. Census Bureau announced its final state-by-state 
population counts, which indicated that Minnesota would keep its 
eight congressional seats.25  The following day, the Minnesota 
House of Representatives announced the members of the 2011–
2012 Redistricting Committee (which included seven Republicans 
and five Democrats),26 and on March 16, 2011, Minnesota received 
its official, detailed population totals for the entire state.27 
The Minnesota House Redistricting Committee began meeting 
 
 21.  Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 2012). 
 22.  MINN. STAT. § 204B.14, subdiv. 1(a) (2010) (“It is the intention of the 
legislature to complete congressional and legislative redistricting activities in time 
to permit counties and municipalities to begin the process of reestablishing 
precinct boundaries as soon as possible after the adoption of the congressional 
and legislative redistricting plans but in no case later than 25 weeks before the 
state primary election in the year ending in two.”).  The 2012 Minnesota primary 
election was August 14, thus the statutory redistricting deadline was February 21, 
2012. 
 23.  See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (holding that “[t]he 
power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate 
a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but 
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged”). 
 24.  2010 Census Forms Arrive in 120 Million Mailboxes Across Nation, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases 
/archives/2010_census/cb10-cn14.html.  
 25.  Tom Scheck, Minnesota Keeps 8 Seats, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Dec. 21, 
2010, 10:54 AM), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns 
/polinaut/archive/2010/12/minnesota_keeps.shtml.  
 26.  Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Here’s the MN House Committee Membership, STAR 
TRIB. (Dec. 22, 2010, 6:06 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/blogs 
/112344804.html.  
 27.  U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Minnesota’s 2010 Census Population Totals, 
Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases 
/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn89.html.  This data provided more in-depth 
information such as populations of political subdivisions, race and ethnic group 
populations, housing unit data, and other information that assists with 
redistricting.  See id. 
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on January 11, 2011, and continued to meet as a committee into 
May of the same year.28  The committee heard testimony from 
many groups and individuals representing various geographical, 
economic, and ethnic groups throughout the state.29  On April 11, 
2011, Representative Sarah Anderson (R-43A), chair of the 
Redistricting Committee, introduced two bills outlining a plan for 
congressional and legislative redistricting.30  The Republican-
controlled House passed the legislative redistricting bill on May 6, 
2011,31 and the congressional redistricting bill on May 13, 2011.32  
On May 17, 2011, the Republican-controlled Senate passed both 
bills,33 but these bills were promptly vetoed by the governor, a 
Democrat, the following day.34 
While the aforementioned legislative process was being carried 
out in the Minnesota House and Senate, a related proceeding was 
taking place in the Minnesota judiciary.  On January 21, 2011, a 
lawsuit was filed in Wright County District Court alleging that based 
on the 2010 census, the current legislative and congressional 
districts were no longer equal in population and thus 
unconstitutional.35  Four days later, the petitioners requested that 
 
 28.  Redistricting Committee Meeting Minutes 2011–2012, MINN. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/committee.asp?comm 
=87016 (last visited on Jan. 22, 2013). 
 29.  This included representatives from groups such as the Minnesota 
Association of Townships, the League of Women Voters, and the Council on Black 
Minnesotans.  See Minn. House Redistricting Comm., Eighth Meeting Minutes, MINN. 
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm 
/minutes1.asp?comm=87016&id=337&ls_year=87; Minn. House Redistricting 
Comm., Ninth Meeting Minutes, MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/minutes1.asp?comm=87016&id=398&ls 
_year=87; Minn. House Redistricting Comm., Tenth Meeting Minutes, MINN. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm 
/minutes1.asp?comm=87016&id=425&ls_year=87. 
 30.  See H.R. 1425, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011) (legislative redistricting 
bill); H.R. 1426, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011) (congressional redistricting 
bill). 
 31.  H.R. JOURNAL, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3374 (Minn. 2011), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2011-12/J0506050.htm#3374. 
 32.  Id. at 3722, available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals 
/2011-12/J0513055.htm#3722. 
 33.  S. JOURNAL, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2117–18 (Minn. 2011), available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/gotopage.php?session=ls87&number 
=2118. 
 34.  H.R. JOURNAL, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. 4984 (Minn. 2011), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2011-12/J0523064.htm#4984. 
 35.  Complaint at 12, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. 86-CV-11-433 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public 
6
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the chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court appoint a special 
judicial redistricting panel to oversee the redistricting process 
because the parties believed that the legislature was unlikely to 
come to an agreement on a redistricting plan.36  The chief justice 
granted the petitioners’ request but stayed the appointment of the 
special redistricting panel and any further proceedings until the 
state legislature had the opportunity to enact redistricting plans.37 
Immediately after the Governor rejected the House’s 
redistricting plan, the petitioners filed a motion to lift the chief 
justice’s stay on the appointment of the special judicial redistricting 
panel.38  On June 1, 2011, the chief justice appointed a Special 
Redistricting Panel to hear and decide all matters regarding the 
legislative and congressional redistricting.39  This five-judge panel40 
was charged with the responsibility to design and implement both 
congressional and legislative redistricting plans if the legislature 
and the Governor failed to enact their own statutorily and 
constitutionally valid plans before the constitutional deadline.41 
On February 21, 2012, the Special Redistricting Panel issued 
two orders—one adopting a legislative redistricting plan and the 
 
/Court_Information_Office/2011Redistricting/01_-_Complaint.pdf. 
 36.  Petition for Appointment of Special Redistricting Panel,                               
Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11-152 (Minn. Jan. 25, 2011), available                                                            
at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office 
/2011Redistricting/02_-_Petition_for_Appointment_of_SRP.pdf. 
 37.  Order, Hippert, No. A11-152 (Feb. 14, 2011),                                            
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information 
_Office/2011Redistricting/A110152Order2.14.11.pdf. 
 38.  Motion to Lift Stay and Appoint Panel, Hippert, No. A11-152                          
(May 18, 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents 
/0/Public/Court_Information_Office/2011Redistricting/08_-_Motion_to_lift 
_stay_and_appoint_panel.pdf. 
 39.  Order, Hippert, No. A11-152 (June 1, 2011), available                                         
at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office 
/2011Redistricting/A110152Order6.1.11.pdf. 
 40.  This panel consisted of the following judges: Wilhelmina Wright, 
presiding judge (Jesse Ventura (I) appointee), Ivy Bernhardson (Tim Pawlenty 
(R) appointee), James Florey (Arne Carlson (R) appointee), Edward Lynch (Rudy 
Perpich (D) appointee), and John Rodenberg (also a Ventura appointee).  
Elizabeth Dunbar, Judges Appointed to Redistricting Panel, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS 
(June 2, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/06/02 
/redistricting-panel [hereinafter Dunbar, Judges Appointed].  It is also worth noting 
that Chief Justice Lorie Gildea is a Pawlenty appointee.  Elizabeth Dunbar, Gildea 
Named to Take Magnuson’s Place on High Court, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (May 13, 
2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/05/13/magnuson              
-replacement. 
 41.  Dunbar, Judges Appointed, supra note 40. 
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other adopting a congressional redistricting plan—as the state 
legislature was unable to enact a plan as mandated by the 
Minnesota Constitution.42  In determining an appropriate plan, the 
Special Redistricting Panel sought out information from numerous 
sources.  Each group of plaintiffs to the action submitted proposed 
redistricting maps43 and participated in oral argument on the 
proposed plans.44  The Special Redistricting Panel also considered 
the House Redistricting Committee’s record, held eight public 
hearings across the state, and received written comments and maps 
from the public in order to receive as much input as possible.45 
The Special Redistricting Panel stated, “When the judicial 
branch performs redistricting, it lacks the political authority of the 
legislative and executive branches and, therefore, must act in a 
restrained and deliberative manner to accomplish the task.”46  To 
that end, the panel stated that it utilized the following “politically 
neutral redistricting principles”: 
(1) drawing districts with a maximum deviation of two 
percent from the ideal population; 
(2)drawing districts without the purpose or effect of 
denying or abridging the voting rights of any United 
States citizen on account of race, ethnicity, or 
membership in a language minority group; 
(3)drawing districts that consist of convenient, contiguous 
territory structured into compact units; 
(4) drawing districts that represent political subdivisions; 
(5) preserving communities of interest; and 
(6)drawing districts without the purpose of either 
 
 42.  Hippert v. Ritchie (Hippert I), 813 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 2012) (legislative 
redistricting plan); Hippert v. Ritchie (Hippert II), 813 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2012) 
(congressional redistricting plan). 
 43.  In both Hippert cases, there were three groups of plaintiffs: the “Hippert” 
group, the “Martin” group, and the “Britton” group.  Devin Henry, DFL Maps a 
Lesson in Partisan Redistricting, MINNPOST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.minnpost 
.com/dc-dispatches/2011/11/dfl-maps-lesson-partisan-redistricting.  The Hippert 
Plaintiffs represented the interests of the Minnesota Republican Party, and their 
proposed map was identical to the maps passed by the Minnesota Legislature; the 
Martin Plaintiffs represented the interests of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party (DFL) (Martin is the state DFL chair); and the Britton Plaintiffs also 
represented the interests of the DFL and provided a contingency map.  Id. 
 44.  Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d at 379–80. 
 45.  Id. at 380.  Examples of comments include the “sovereignty and interests 
of federally recognized Indian tribes,” regionally shared governmental and 
educational services, and “communities of interest that span counties.”  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 378. 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/10
  
2013] THE CONTROVERSY OF REDISTRICTING 1341 
protecting or defeating incumbents.47 
The panel also utilized a “least-change” strategy where possible, 
which meant that it began the process using the “old” maps as a 
starting point and only modified them enough to satisfy the equal 
representation requirement.48  The panel also stated that the plan 
was not drawn with the purpose to infringe on any citizen’s voting 
rights on account of race or ethnicity and thus complied with both 
the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.49  Finally, 
the panel determined that the implemented plan did not “result in 
either undue incumbent protection or excessive incumbent 
conflicts.”50  Thus, the legislative and congressional district 
boundaries determined by the Special Redistricting Panel went into 
effect for the 2012 election cycle. 
III. CRITICISM OF THE MINNESOTA METHOD 
Recently, there has been much criticism over the process that 
Minnesota employs for legislative and congressional redistricting. 
Redistricting by the legislature draws criticism because 
legislators are, in essence, choosing who votes for them.51  Each 
political party attempts to draw a map with as many districts that 
will lean in its favor.  Mike Dean, Executive Director of Common 
Cause Minnesota, asserts, “Technology has evolved . . . over the last 
30 years, where politicians are . . . able to craft districts to their own 
advantage . . . .  That creates a process where we have elections that 
are not competitive, where . . . the outcome of the election is a 
foregone conclusion . . . .”52  Thus, critics argue, leaving the 
 
 47.  Id. at 379 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  The principles 
enunciated in the text were outlined in the first Hippert case and therefore were 
specifically relevant for legislative redistricting.  In the second Hippert case, the 
court enunciated similar, yet slightly different principles for congressional 
redistricting:  
(1) adherence to the United States Constitution; (2) adherence to the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965; (3) adherence to Minnesota’s statutory 
requirements for congressional redistricting, such as drawing districts 
that comprise convenient, contiguous territory; (4) adherence to well-
established redistricting principles, such as creating compact districts and 
preserving communities of interest; and (5) drawing districts without the 
purpose of either protecting or defeating incumbents. 
Hippert II, 813 N.W.2d at 395 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 48.  Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d at 380. 
 49.  Id. at 384. 
 50.  Id. at 386. 
 51.  See Pugmire, supra note 9. 
 52.  Id.   
9
Boese: The Controversy of Redistricting in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1342 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
redistricting process to the legislature only promotes political and 
self-interested map drawing by a partisan legislature.53 
Another criticism is that both the legislature and the judiciary 
are involved in the process, yet both branches serve two very 
different purposes.  While redistricting is mandatory to ensure that 
each citizen’s vote is equal,54 it has become a political duel, with 
both parties fighting for as much of a political advantage as 
possible.55  Critics assert that this type of jockeying for political 
advantages is not well-suited for a state judiciary that is tasked with 
the responsibility of remaining politically neutral.56  And while it is 
true that the state legislature has the first responsibility for 
redistricting, Minnesota’s history has demonstrated that the 
judiciary plays an active role in the redistricting process—the 
Minnesota legislature has not enacted its own plan since 1966, and 
even that plan could not escape its fair share of judicial 
involvement.57  Critics state that the judicial branch must be 
perceived by the public as a politically neutral entity in order for 
the citizenry to have confidence that the courts are making 
impartial and unbiased decisions.58 
On the same note, critics assert that having the courts as a 
fallback option if the legislature fails to enact a redistricting plan 
gives the legislature less reason to actually attempt to negotiate.59  
Politicians in the legislature may not be willing to negotiate 
earnestly if they assume that the courts are ultimately going to end 
up drawing the maps anyway.60  By having the courts as a safety net, 
 
 53.  See Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Minnesota’s Former Leaders Call for a New 
Redistricting System, STAR TRIB., Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics 
/117591033.html. 
 54.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“The Equal Protection 
Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for 
all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.”). 
 55.  See Kalitowski & Brama, supra note 13, at 19. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See Wattson, supra note 12, at 2.  The legislature’s 1959 plan was declared 
invalid by Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (D. Minn. 1964).  Id.  In 1965, the 
Legislature passed a new redistricting bill, which was vetoed by the Governor.  Id.  
An approved plan was eventually passed into law in 1966.  Id.  Ever since then, the 
judiciary has had to intervene and implement a court-approved plan for legislative 
redistricting.  Id. at 3–5. 
 58.  See Kalitowski & Brama, supra note 13, at 19. 
 59.  Lawrence R. Jacobs, Redistricting Reform to Fix a Broken System and                
Restore Competition, MIDWEST DEMOCRACY NETWORK 2 (Jan. 2008), http:// 
www.midwestdemocracynetwork.org/files/pdf/Redistricting_Reform.pdf. 
 60.  Id. 
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there is no incentive for politicians to give up any ground during 
the legislative process of redistricting—they know that if they do 
not come to a decision and the courts draw a map they do not 
agree with, they can use the courts as a scapegoat when 
campaigning in the following election season. 
A fourth criticism of the Minnesota process is that a lawsuit is 
required in order to get the courts involved in the redistricting 
process.  These suits are usually based on the fact that the current 
legislative districts are unconstitutional because they violate both 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment61 and 
the Civil Rights Act.62  Parties spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in legal fees during this judicial process.63  While the Civil 
Rights Act allows the awarding of attorney’s fees to parties that 
prevail in suits under the Act,64 the parties will likely spend much 
more throughout the process than what they actually end up 
receiving.65  Thus, questions arise as to the necessity of individuals 
and/or groups having to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
implement something that is constitutionally mandated. 
Others have been critical of the lack of public input that is 
available to the decision makers during redistricting.  In the 2011 
cycle, the Special Redistricting Panel traveled throughout the state 
to hear public comments.66  They also invited members of the 
public to submit their own maps.67  Critics, however, stated that 
while the public was allowed to give input, the window for that 
input closed before the Panel announced the criteria to be used in 
determining Minnesota’s districts.68 
 
 61.  See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 35, at 9–10. 
 62.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 63.  See, e.g., Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs at 16–20, Hippert v. 
Ritchie, No. A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Aug. 16, 2012), available  
at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office 
/2011Redistricting/A110152Order_-_Taxation_of_Costs-Disbursements_andor 
_Atty_Fees.pdf.  The Hippert Plaintiffs sought $225,000 in attorney’s fees from the 
state (their documentation indicated that one firm billed them over $400,000 in 
attorney fees), the Martin Plaintiffs sought $292,131 in attorney’s fees, and the 
Britton Plaintiffs sought $174,000 in attorney’s fees.  Id. 
 64.  Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 65.  See, e.g., Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs, supra note 63, at 15–22 
(awarding all parties $115,000, which was much less than what each requested). 
 66.  Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn. 2012). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Lois Beckett & Olga Pierce, In Minn. Redistricting Battle, Powerful Players 
Clash—With Citizens on Sidelines, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:38 PM), http:// 
www.propublica.org/article/in-minn-redistricting-battle-powerful-players-clash 
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While one can likely find endless critiques of the current 
redistricting process in Minnesota, other states have attempted to 
deal with some of these criticisms by implementing different 
strategies and processes for redistricting. 
IV. WHAT ARE OTHER STATES DOING? 
Every state’s method of redistricting varies, but there are three 
types of methods worth noting.  The first method is used by a 
majority of states, including Minnesota, and it charges the 
legislature with drawing new maps every ten years.69  The second 
method gives at least some of the redistricting responsibility to 
independent commissions, and this method is used by thirteen 
states including the state of Arizona.70  Iowa, the only remaining 
state, utilizes a unique method by having a nonpartisan state agency 
draw district maps without the use of any political or election data, 
and these maps are ultimately approved by the legislature and the 
governor.71 
In order to effectively determine whether Minnesota should 
reform its method of redistricting, it is prudent to analyze the 
alternative methods used by other states around the country.  
Therefore, the following sections discuss in detail the independent 
commission method used by the state of Arizona as well as Iowa’s 
method of using a state agency to assist with redistricting. 
A. Arizona Method–Independent Redistricting Commission 
Prior to 2000, the Arizona legislature was charged with the 
responsibility of drawing new legislative and congressional district 
 
-with-citizens-on-sideli. 
 69.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010               
161–62 (2009), available at http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/lg/PDF/NCSL 
%20Redistrictiing%202010.pdf (identifying thirty-six states where the legislatures 
have the authority for both congressional and state redistricting). 
 70.  2009 Redistricting Commissions Table, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissions-
table.aspx (last updated June 25, 2008) (listing thirteen states: Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.). 
 71.  See W. Walter Hearne, Methods to Madness: Alternative Schemes for Single-
Member Redistricting, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/reports/monopoly 
/redist.html (last updated August 12, 1998); see also Ed Cook, Legislative Guide to 
Redistricting in Iowa, LEGIS. SERVICES AGENCY 12–20 (Dec. 2007), https:// 
www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/Central/Guides/redist.pdf (outlining the redistricting 
process in Iowa). 
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boundaries after each decennial census.72  In November 2000, 
Proposition 106 was approved by Arizona voters, amending the 
Arizona Constitution and creating the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission.73  The purpose for the amendment and 
creation of the Independent Redistricting Commission was to make 
legislative and congressional districts more competitive by taking 
the redistricting process out of the hands of incumbent legislators 
and giving the task to a politically neutral entity.74 
Under article IV, part 2, section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, 
“[b]y February 28 of each year that ends in one, an independent 
redistricting commission shall be established to provide for the 
redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts.”75  The 
commission consists of five members, with no more than two 
members being affiliated with the same political party.76  The 
members of the commission cannot “have been appointed to, 
elected to, or a candidate for any . . . public office” within the three 
years previous to the appointment.77 
The Arizona Commission on Appellate Court Appointments is 
responsible for the nomination of candidates for appointment to 
the commission.78  This pool of candidates consists of twenty-five 
individuals—ten from each of the two largest political parties in 
Arizona and five who are not registered with either of the two 
largest political parties.79  From this pool of twenty-five candidates, 
the highest-ranking officer in the Arizona House of 
Representatives, the minority party leader in the Arizona House of 
 
 72.  Rhonda L. Barnes, Comment, Redistricting in Arizona Under the Proposition 
106 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation and Regret, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 575, 578 
(2003). 
 73.  Id. at 577; see ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2000 PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 54–60 
(2000), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/info/pubpamphlet 
/english/prop106.pdf (describing Proposition 106, which amended article IV, 
part 2, section 1 of the Constitution of Arizona). 
 74.  ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 73, at 57 (summarizing the argument for 
passage of Proposition 106 from Janet Napolitano, Arizona attorney general). 
 75.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(4).  The Arizona Commission on Appellate Court 
Appointments is a nonpartisan commission which is composed of the chief justice 
of the Arizona Supreme Court, five attorney members (nominated by the board of 
governors of the Arizona State Bar, appointed by the governor with advice and 
consent of the senate), and ten nonattorney members (appointed by the governor 
with advice and consent of the senate).  Id. art. VI, § 36(A). 
 79.  Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(5); see also Jacobs, supra note 59, at 4. 
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Representatives, the highest-ranking officer in the Arizona Senate, 
and the minority party leader in the Arizona Senate each choose 
one candidate to serve on the Independent Redistricting 
Commission.80  These four members of the commission then meet 
and select, by majority vote, the fifth member of the commission.81  
This fifth member must be one of the nominees not registered with 
either party already represented, and this member also serves as 
chair of the commission.82 
The redistricting commission is directed by the Arizona 
Constitution to create districts “in a grid-like pattern across the 
state.”83  The purpose for this provision is to make sure that the 
commission will draw maps from scratch every ten years rather than 
simply modifying the existing districts.84  In drawing legislative and 
congressional districts, the commission is mandated to 
accommodate the following goals: 
A.  Districts shall comply with the United States 
Constitution and the United States voting rights act; 
B.  Congressional districts shall have equal population to 
the extent practicable, and state legislative districts shall 
have equal population to the extent practicable; 
C.  Districts shall be geographically compact and 
contiguous to the extent practicable; 
D.  District boundaries shall respect communities of 
interest to the extent practicable; 
E.  To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible 
geographic features, city, town, and county boundaries, 
and undivided census tracts; 
F.  To the extent practicable, competitive districts should 
be favored where to do so would create no significant 
detriment to the other goals.85 
When drawing the legislative and congressional districts, 
incumbent and candidate residences are not identified or 
considered by the commission.86  Also, information concerning 
voting history and party registration is not to be considered when 
 
 80.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(6). 
 81.  Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(8). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14). 
 84.  Glossary, ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://azredistricting 
.org /about-irc/Glossary.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
 85.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(A)–(F). 
 86.  Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(15). 
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drawing the maps, although this information may be used to make 
sure the final maps comply with the aforementioned goals.87 
Prior to the first draft of maps, the commission holds hearings 
throughout the state to get input on communities of interest and 
other information to consider when drafting the district maps.88  
Once the commission drafts an initial map, it is then advertised for 
public comment.89  The public, as well as either legislative body, 
may make recommendations for the commission to consider.90  
Following this comment period, the commission then promulgates 
the final legislative and congressional district boundaries.91 
B. Iowa Method 
Prior to 1980, the Iowa Constitution required the Iowa 
General Assembly to establish legislative and congressional districts 
every ten years after the decennial census.92  If the legislature was 
unable to enact a redistricting plan by a specified date, the Iowa 
Supreme Court was charged with the responsibility of 
redistricting.93  This process, however, changed in 1980 when the 
Iowa legislature passed House File 707, which established a new 
procedure for drawing legislative and congressional districts.94 
Iowa law tasks the Legislative Services Agency95 with the 
responsibility of drawing legislative and congressional district maps, 
which are then submitted to the Iowa legislature and governor for 
approval or denial.96  When the Legislative Services Agency delivers 
the redistricting plan to the state legislature, the agency must also 
provide to the public copies of the bill, maps illustrating the plan, a 
 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Barnes, supra note 72, at 580. 
 89.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(16).  The comment period must be at least 
thirty days.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Cook, supra note 71, at 1; see IOWA CONST. art. III, § 35 (“The general 
assembly shall . . . in each year immediately following the United States decennial 
census . . . establish senatorial and representative districts.”). 
 93.  IOWA CONST. art. III, § 35. 
 94.  Cook, supra note 71, at 2.  This law was codified in Iowa Code chapter 42.  
Id. at n.15; see IOWA CODE ANN. § 42 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 95.  The Legislative Services Agency “provides nonpartisan staff services to all 
members of the Iowa General Assembly.”  Central Nonpartisan Staff, IOWA LEGIS., 
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/Agencies/nonPartisanStaff.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 
2013). 
 96.  § 42.3(1)(a) (Westlaw); see Cook, supra note 71, at 2. 
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summary of the standards used in designing the plan, and a 
statement of each district’s population.97 
When formulating a redistricting plan, the Legislative Services 
Agency must consider certain factors apart from the normal 
population and race considerations.  First, to the extent possible, 
when drawing the district boundaries, the boundaries of political 
subdivisions should not be disturbed.98  Second, districts must be 
made up of contiguous territory.99  Finally, districts should be as 
compact as possible.100  This means that, to the extent possible, 
districts should not be irregularly shaped.101  Iowa law also 
mandates that “[n]o district shall be drawn for the purpose of 
favoring a political party, incumbent legislator or member of 
Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of 
augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial 
minority group.”102  Therefore, the agency is not allowed to 
consider where any incumbent legislator or member of Congress 
resides, the political affiliations of the voters, any past election 
results, and any demographic information other than what is 
required by the Constitution and U.S. law.103 
Iowa law also states that a temporary redistricting advisory 
commission should be established that is made up of five 
members.104  Unlike the duties of redistricting commissions like in 
Arizona, the Iowa commission’s duties do not include any drawing 
of maps.  The Iowa redistricting commission has two main 
responsibilities.  First, if the Legislative Services Agency needs to 
make some kind of decision for which there is no statutory 
guideline, the redistricting commission may provide direction to 
the agency.105  Second, when the redistricting bill is delivered to the 
 
 97.  § 42.2(4)(a)–(d) (Westlaw). 
 98.  Id. § 42.4(2). 
 99.  Id. § 42.4(3). 
 100.  Id. § 42.4(4). 
 101.  Id.  The statute states, “The compactness of a district is greatest when the 
length of the district and the width of the district are equal[, and when] . . . the 
distance needed to traverse the perimeter boundary of a district is as short as 
possible.”  Id. § 42.4(4)(a)–(b). 
 102.  Id. § 42.4(5). 
 103.  Id. § 42.4(5)(a)–(d). 
 104.  Id. § 42.5(1).  These members are chosen in a similar fashion as Arizona 
chooses its five-member commission.  Four of the five members are chosen by the 
majority and minority leaders in both the house and the senate, while the fifth 
member is chosen by a majority vote of the four commission members.  Cook, 
supra note 71, at 13–14.  This fifth member serves as the chairperson.  Id. at 14. 
 105.  § 42.6(1) (Westlaw). 
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legislature, the commission must conduct three public hearings 
throughout the state and present a report to both the senate and 
the house that summarizes the comments and conclusions made 
during those public hearings.106 
If the legislature fails to enact the first plan that is submitted by 
the Legislative Services Agency, the legislature must provide 
reasons to the agency as to why the plan was rejected, and the 
agency is required to submit another plan.107  A vote on the second 
plan must be held not less than seven days after the plan is 
submitted, and no amendments to the bill may be offered (other 
than those that are purely corrective in nature).108  If the legislature 
fails to enact the second plan, the legislature must again provide 
the agency with the reasons it rejected it.109  The third plan’s 
submission to the legislature follows the same timetable as the 
second plan,110 but it is subject to amendment by the legislature.111  
If the legislature still fails to enact a redistricting plan, the Iowa 
Supreme Court is tasked with formulating an appropriate 
redistricting plan.112 
V. ANALYSIS OF REDISTRICTING METHODS 
Any system of redistricting will garner both praise and criticism 
from the public, regardless of how bipartisan or nonpartisan the 
process is.  While there will never be one “perfect” method for 
states to utilize when they redistrict, some are less criticized than 
others.  Therefore, before one can adequately judge if a new 
method for redistricting is necessary in Minnesota, it is sensible to 
first understand how successful each method has been and also 
how each has been critiqued. 
 
 106.  Id. § 42.6(3)(a)–(b). 
 107.  Id. § 42.3(2).  This second plan must be submitted within thirty-five days 
of the first bill’s nonpassage.  Id. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. § 42.3(3). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  While there is no statutory provision that states the redistricting process 
would go to the Iowa Supreme Court, one can assume that the supreme court 
would take up the process since the United States Supreme Court has stated that 
judicial supervision of redistricting is encouraged when the legislature fails to 
enact a plan.  See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). 
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A. Redistricting Through the State Legislature 
Partisan redistricting through the legislative process is usually 
criticized for reducing electoral competition, but there are some 
commentators who argue that partisan redistricting can actually 
strengthen competition.113  These commentators state that political 
parties, by attempting to gain as many seats in the state legislature 
as possible, may create more districts that lean toward their party, 
but these districts will likely have a smaller margin of victory.114  For 
example, rather than having a few very strong Republican districts, 
partisan districting may create more districts that are only “light 
pink” rather than “bright red,” which may allow Democrats to be 
more competitive in those districts.  Others argue, however, that 
this results because of failed partisan redistricting rather than as a 
natural consequence that stems from it.115  Those who argue that 
partisan redistricting decreases competition state that empirical 
evidence suggests that while there are some outlier cases of partisan 
redistricting creating more competitive districts, in most cases the 
partisan redistricting decreases competition.116 
Other proponents of redistricting through the legislative 
process argue that independent commissions are not elected by the 
people of the state and thus, are not accountable to the voters like 
legislators are.117  They also argue that while legislatures sometimes 
have a difficult time agreeing on districting maps, especially in 
 
 113.  See David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is it Time to Draw the Line?: The 
Impact of Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 145 
(2006) (discussing the counterargument to their argument that “partisan 
gerrymandering increases electoral competition”). 
 114.  See id.  After the 1980 census, Indiana Republicans attempted to design a 
congressional redistricting plan that favored their party.  Id.  While the plan 
initially was successful (the pre-redistricting congressional seats favored Democrats 
6–5 while the post-redistricting congressional seats favored Republicans 6–4), by 
1990 the Indiana delegation favored Democrats 8–2.  Id.  Thus, while the plan was 
originally drawn to give the Republicans as many congressional seats as possible, 
the plan backfired because it created more competitive districts that ultimately 
swung back in favor of the Democrats. 
 115.  See id. at 154–55 (finding that partisan redistricting plans negatively 
influence competition in state house elections). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See T.W. Budig, Minnesota Political Heavyweights Weigh In on Redistricting 
Reform, HOMETOWN SOURCE (Mar. 8, 2011) http://hometownsource.com/2011/03 
/08/minnesota-political-heavyweights-weigh-in-on-redistricting-reform (quoting 
Rep. Sarah Anderson (R-Plymouth), chairwoman of the House Redistricting 
Committee, who stated, “The Legislature is an elected body and we are 
accountable to the people of Minnesota . . . [a] commission is not.”). 
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recent redistricting cycles, the ultimate maps drawn by the courts 
have been very fair to both parties.118 
Critics of redistricting by state legislatures argue that voters are 
supposed to choose their legislators, not the other way around.119  
By leaving redistricting up to the state legislatures, critics argue that 
politicians are essentially choosing who will vote for them.  
Proponents of this system, however, counter by stating that while 
the politicians do have some impact on the districts, the voters still 
have to elect the politicians into office.  They assert that there are 
many other factors that go into an election other than simply what 
party is generally favored in the district.120 
Minnesota has not enacted a redistricting plan promulgated by 
the state legislature since the 1960s census.121  Therefore, one could 
argue that with a success rate so low, a new process should be 
adopted.  Others may argue, however, that even though the 
legislature has not been able to promulgate its own map, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has enacted maps that have been 
perceived as fair and unbiased, and thus there is no need for 
reform. 
B. Redistricting Through Independent Commissions 
The redistricting of independent commissions is usually less 
criticized than that of the state legislatures, but there are 
nevertheless concerns over the use of these commissions.  Some 
critics question the validity of such commissions under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Others are skeptical of whether they are truly 
independent and nonpartisan. 
 
 118.  See Chris Steller, Redistricting Draws Reformers but Some Say Process Worked 
Fine Last Time, MINN. INDEP. (May 22, 2009) http://minnesotaindependent.com            
/35240/redistricting-reform-minnesota-bachmann. 
 119.  See Robert Pack, Land Grab: The Pros and Cons of Congressional Redistricting, 
D.C. B. (Apr. 2004) http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications 
/washington_lawyer/april_2004/landgrab.cfm (quoting Ronald Klain, a former 
aide to President Clinton, who stated that “[legislators] draw the lines, they benefit 
from the lines, and it’s very hard for the people to respond because they can’t vote 
the rascals out”). 
 120.  See id. (quoting Tom Davis, former Congressman from Virginia, who 
stated, “The voters still elect.  There are still districts where Republicans have a 
voter registration advantage that [they’re] going to lose, and districts that have a 
Democratic voter registration advantage that they [will] lose.  There are other 
factors in representation [than] just the party to be considered, such as the quality 
of the candidates and what part of the district they hail from.”). 
 121.  See  supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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Some critics of the use of independent redistricting 
commissions question their constitutionality.122  Article I, Section 4 
of the U.S. Constitution states, “The Times, Places, and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”123  
Therefore, critics argue, the Constitution specifically states that 
only the legislature has the power to redraw legislative and 
congressional districts, and thus the use of an independent 
commission to carry out this task is unconstitutional.124  Other 
critics state that while commissions that were formed through 
legislative action, such as through a bill, are likely constitutional, 
those commissions that were formed through a statewide 
referendum, such as through a constitutional amendment like in 
Arizona, are not.125  Proponents of independent commissions, 
however, claim that the U.S. Constitution used “legislature” in a 
broad sense and meant that the state government as a whole was 
allowed to choose how to elect its members of Congress.126 
While Arizona’s redistricting commission does not use 
incumbent data when redrawing its maps,127 other states that use 
independent commissions do not restrict the commission from 
considering this information.128  Thus, some critics state that 
 
 122.  See Evan Wyloge, GOP Lawmakers Seek to Overturn Redistricting                 
Commission’s Authority to Create Maps, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, May                                              
2, 2012, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/05/02/gop-lawmakers-seek-to                    
-overturn-redistricting-commission’s-authority-to-create-maps/; see also Mark R. 
Brown, Proposed Independent Redistricting Commission is Unconstitutional, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 25, 2012 1:00 PM), http://www.cleveland 
.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/08/proposed _commission_is_unconst.html.  
 123.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 124.  See Wyloge, supra note 122. 
 125.  See Brown, supra note 122 (stating that “[s]o long as it has legislative 
approval, an independent commission would seem to satisfy Article I’s 
command”). 
 126.  Wyloge, supra note 122 (according to Paul Bender, constitutional law 
professor at Arizona State University, “The ‘times, places and manner’ referred to 
in the Constitution refer to the actual machinations of elections . . . [and] ‘the 
Legislature’ . . . means . . . whatever processes the state has established for 
elections . . . .  ‘It includes the state constitution and citizen initiatives.’”).  But see 
Brown, supra note 122 (“[The Framers] did not intend [a state] to have regulatory 
authority over congressional elections; they meant for [the state’s] legislature to 
exercise that power. . . .  The Framers’ choice of legislatures as the repositories of 
federal electoral powers was clearly a studied decision.  State legislative 
regulation . . . provided a middle ground between popular (democratic) and 
national (republican) control of the . . . country’s legislature.”). 
 127.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2.  The New Jersey Constitution does not 
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bipartisan independent commissions are still able to favor 
incumbents and reduce competition in future elections by agreeing 
to draw maps that favor all incumbents, regardless of party 
affiliation.129 
Most independent redistricting panels are still in their infancy 
and thus, it is hard to tell whether the maps they draw are any 
better than the legislature’s maps.  They do, however, seem to at 
least present an appearance of a fairer and more objective process 
of redistricting than redistricting through state legislatures, even 
amidst allegations that political parties are swaying these panels 
one way or another. 
C. The Iowa Method 
Reaction to Iowa’s use of a non-partisan state agency for 
redistricting has been mostly positive.  By giving the map-drawing 
responsibility to an independent state agency while leaving the final 
approval to an up-or-down vote by the state legislature, politicians 
are put in an interesting position.  If the legislature does not like 
the map, it can reject it, but by doing so, legislators risks the 
possibility of the agency sending them a new map that they dislike 
even more.130  Also, because the agency is not allowed to consider 
where incumbents live, the agency’s maps can make for very 
competitive races.131 
 
ban the redistricting commission from considering incumbent information.  See id. 
 129.  See Gary S. Stein, An Unpublicized Scandal: New Jersey’s Non-Competitive 
Congressional Districts, 253 N.J. LAW. 10, 11 (2008) (“The members of the New Jersey 
Redistricting Commission, acting pursuant to constitutional authorization, 
engaged in a bipartisan gerrymander to create congressional districts in which no 
incumbent would be vulnerable.” (footnote omitted)).  The 2006 elections in New 
Jersey were very uncompetitive despite the fact that there was a huge nationwide 
swing of Democrats unseating Republicans due to the public’s discontent with 
President Bush and the Iraq War.  Id. at 10.  In New Jersey, all thirteen incumbents 
won their elections by large margins.  Id. at 10–11.  There was only one race that 
ended with a winning margin of less than 10%.  Id. at 11. 
 130.  Lauren Fox, Iowa Hosting Four Fierce Congressional Races                                  
Thanks to Redistricting, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/05/iowa-hosting-four-fierce-
congressional-races-thanks-to-redistricting-2 (quoting Christopher Larimer, a 
political science professor at Northern Iowa University, who stated, 
“[Redistricting] is almost like a game of chicken.  The legislators can send it back 
for another draft, but then they risk it coming back worse for their party.”). 
 131.  See id. (discussing that congressional redistricting has placed two 
incumbents against each other and caused another incumbent to move his 
residence to run in a different district); David Pitt, Iowa’s 4 US House Seats 
Unusually Competitive, DAILY GATE CITY, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www .dailygate.com 
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The biggest criticism of Iowa’s method is that, because it does 
not consider incumbent data, many incumbents are paired against 
each other in the same district.132  This, critics argue, could lead to 
a high turnover rate of legislators and create instability within the 
legislature. 
Others assert that although this method works well for Iowa, it 
may not work as well for other states.133  Iowa’s population is smaller 
and more homogeneous than the population of many other states, 
and no matter how you draw the districts, there will likely be 
competitive races because there are not large geographical areas 
that are very red or very blue.134  States such as California are much 
more racially diverse and have large areas that strongly favor one 
political party over another.135  This makes drawing competitive 
districts very difficult, and without the use of incumbent 
information, redistricting by a method like Iowa’s will likely not 
have much of an influence on the competitiveness of districts in 
states like California.136 
Although there have been some criticisms of Iowa’s 
redistricting method, since its enactment in 1980137 no redistricting 
plan submitted by the Legislative Service Agency and adopted by 
the legislature has ever been challenged in court.138 
 
/news/article_9d975876-ec45-5f81-92ff-519cc89e8539.html. 
 132.  James Q. Lynch, Redistricting Process Produces ‘Iowa Envy,’ Legal Expert Says, 
QUAD-CITY TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, http://qctimes.com/news/local/government-and                
-politics/article_42a5731c-1a19-11e0-93d1-001cc4c002e0.html (stating that in 
2001, the Legislative Service Agency’s first plan, which was rejected, paired 70 
incumbents against each other, while the second plan, which was adopted, had “39 
House members and 25 senators running in districts where at least one other 
incumbent lived”).  
 133.  See Alan Greenblatt, Can Redistricting Ever Be Fair?, GOVERNING                     
(Nov. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/can-redistricting-ever-be         
-fair .html. 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See id. (statement of Nathaniel Persily, a redistricting consultant at 
Columbia Law School) (“The coast [of California] is so Democratic and the 
interior so Republican, . . . my feeling is that in California, if you’re not going to 
pay attention to incumbency and you start drawing districts from north to south, 
there’s only so much partisan impact redistricting is going to have.”).  The article 
also states that in order to make Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi’s district 
competitive, it would have to stretch from San Francisco all the way to Nevada.  Id. 
 137.  See Cook, supra note 71, at 2. 
 138.  Id. 
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VI.  DOES MINNESOTA REALLY NEED REDISTRICTING REFORM? 
Even though the redistricting process was recently completed 
in Minnesota,139 addressing the possibility of reforming Minnesota’s 
process should not be tabled for a later date.  Discussion of 
whether Minnesota should change its redistricting method, and if 
so, ideas of how this could be done, should be discussed while the 
process is still fresh in everyone’s memory.  While many claim that 
Minnesota’s method is broken,140 it seems that this assertion may 
overstate the issue.  It is clear that reforms must be made, but 
before Minnesota completely changes its system and takes 
complete control of redistricting out of the hands of our elected 
officials, smaller reforms, such as establishing standard redistricting 
guidelines for judges to consider and removing the need for a 
formal lawsuit, should be considered first. 
A. Establish Concrete Redistricting Guidelines 
The current status of America’s political climate is clearly very 
partisan.141  Does this mean, however, that the current system of 
government is broken and thus should be reformed?  Though 
there are some who think the U.S. Constitution should be 
rewritten,142 most individuals do not believe that the United States 
needs to start from scratch.  Are changes needed?  Absolutely.  
Should we transform the entire system?  Probably not.  So too is it 
with legislative and congressional redistricting.  Yes, changes are 
clearly needed, but before one throws out a system of redistricting 
that is used in a majority of states throughout the country, more 
gradual, common-sense reforms should first be implemented and 
evaluated before larger changes are made. 
 
 139.  See Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 2012) (promulgating Minnesota’s 
new legislative districts on February 21, 2012); Hippert II, 813 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 
2012) (promulgating Minnesota’s new congressional districts on February 21, 
2012). 
 140.  See Jacobs, supra note 59, at 1 (stating that the redistricting reform is vital 
because the current system is “broken”). 
 141.  See Liz Halloran, Has Partisanship Really Gotten So Bad on the Hill? Yes, NAT. 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 17, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story 
.php?storyId=123783904 (“Historians and politicos alike say the current rancor on 
the Hill is . . . historic, and has been building over recent decades to a level unlike 
any in modern times.”). 
 142.  See, e.g., George Kenney, America Needs a New Constitution, HUFFINGTON 
POST BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george                  
-kenney/america-needs-a-new-const_b_772288.html. 
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It seems that the recent push for redistricting reform, not just 
in Minnesota but also throughout the country, stems from a 
cynical, yet substantiated, distrust of politicians.  The public views 
politicians as self-interested individuals who are more focused on 
their own reelection than serving the public interest.  Although 
there is some truth in this statement, this is not true across-the-
board.  Many politicians have sacrificed lucrative careers to be 
public servants, not for fame and notoriety, but because they felt 
they had a civic duty to serve the people of their state.  Public 
officials are elected to make decisions that they believe are in the 
public’s best interest.143  If there is discontent with the adequacy of 
an elected official’s representation, such as if he is placing his own 
well-being before the public’s, constituents have the ability to elect 
someone else. 
By placing redistricting in the hands of a commission, we 
effectively remove this decision-making process from the elected 
officials that the public chose to make decisions in its best interest.  
While some view this as a good thing because it takes this decision 
away from the individuals who stand to benefit from it, the framers 
of the Constitution seemed to intend for this to be part of the job 
of state legislators.144  Therefore, it is the public’s responsibility to 
elect politicians who it believes will represent it with honesty and 
integrity rather than for his or her self-interest.  Bipartisanship is 
not impossible, and faith in the legislature should not be 
abandoned so quickly. 
This is not to say, however, that these politicians should not be 
without limits on how the redistricting proceeding takes place.  
Currently, there are only a few mandated rules that Minnesota 
legislators must adhere to when they undertake the redistricting 
process: (1) legislative and congressional districts must be 
approximately the same population;145 (2) districts cannot be drawn 
 
 143.  See Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Republic for Which 
It Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
1057, 1059–60 (1996) (“In a republic, . . . the superior force of an interested and 
overbearing majority could be tempered by the reasoned judgment of 
representatives acting for the common good.” (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 144.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 145.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct 
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (“While it may not be 
possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that is no 
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to deny equal voting power to anyone on the basis of race, color, or 
ethnic group;146 (3) districts must be one contiguous territory;147 
and (4) the Minnesota Senate must consist of sixty-seven members, 
and the Minnesota House of Representatives must consist of 134 
members.148  To better foster neutrality during the redistricting 
process while keeping this task within the state legislature’s 
purview, it seems prudent that additional principles should be 
adhered to throughout the process. 
Because the judiciary lacks the political authority of the 
legislative branch, Minnesota courts have established “politically 
neutral redistricting principles” that guide its redistricting 
process.149  These principles include: 
[1] drawing districts with a maximum deviation of two 
percent from the ideal population; . . . [2] drawing 
districts that consist of convenient, contiguous territory 
structured into compact units; [3] drawing districts that 
respect political subdivisions; [4] preserving communities 
of interest; and [5] drawing districts without the purpose 
of either protecting or defeating incumbents.150 
Many of these principles are also used in states like Iowa and 
Arizona, and have helped those states create more competitive and 
fair maps. 
The court also uses a “least-change strategy” when possible, 
using the prior districts as a starting point and changing them only 
as necessary to make the districts as equal in population as 
possible.151  A “least-change strategy” seems to be less political than 
drawing maps from scratch, like they do in Arizona, because by 
mandating that the maps be only altered enough to account for the 
 
excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal 
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the [U.S.] 
House of Representatives.”). 
 146.  42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State 
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color . . . .”); Id. § 1973b(f)(2) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote because he is a member of a language minority group.”). 
 147.  MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 148.  MINN. STAT. § 2.021 (2010). 
 149.  See Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378–79 (2012); see also supra Part II. 
 150.  Hippert I, 813 N.W.2d at 379 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 151.  Id. at 380. 
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population changes, there is a starting point to work from and it is 
not as easy to redraw district boundaries for a specific benefit.  
Starting from scratch places no limits on how legislators can draw a 
new map and opens the door to be able to politically gerrymander 
the state to a particular party’s advantage. 
An additional principle that has been included by other states 
is that districts are to be drawn without the use of voting history.152  
Iowa has a specific provision that bans the consideration of past 
voting data when drawing new maps.153  By not considering this 
information, new map drawing has led to much more competitive 
electoral races in the state. 
If Minnesota’s legislature adopted these principles in addition 
to the principles that are mandated by the U.S. Constitution, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and Minnesota law, much of the politics that 
plagues the redistricting process would be minimized.  Incumbents 
could no longer draw maps to make sure their territory was safe, 
political parties could not be favored, and the least-change method 
would reduce the possibility of placing many incumbents within the 
same district and thus, theoretically, maintain stability in the 
legislature. 
B. Reform the Judicial Process 
Many also argue that judges should not be involved in the 
drawing of districts, as they are in Minnesota, because it is critical 
that the justice system be perceived as fair.154  In Minnesota, judges 
do not declare a political affiliation,155 even though they are elected 
officials.156  Thus, it is argued, since redistricting is an inherently 
political process, judges should abstain from deciding such political 
questions and should not be responsible for drawing new 
congressional and legislative maps. 
While it is true that judges are not supposed to decide political 
questions, certain challenges to redistricting are justiciable issues.157  
 
 152.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 153.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 154.  See Kalitowski & Brama, supra note 13, at 19. 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“[Judges] shall be elected by the voters from 
the area which they are to serve in the manner provided by law.”). 
 157.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the redistricting was not 
a political question and thus justiciable).  But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that political gerrymandering was not a 
justiciable question because of a lack of manageable standards on which to judge). 
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And even though courts are not supposed to decide “political 
questions,” courts frequently address questions with political 
implications.158  Judges are dedicated to applying the law in a 
neutral and equitable fashion and thus are more than capable of 
deciding politically controversial questions under the law as long as 
there are legally concrete standards that can be applied.159  
Therefore, if the legislature were to adopt the principles discussed 
above to govern the redistricting process, the courts would have 
concrete, legally binding guidelines to apply if and when the 
responsibility of redistricting fell on their shoulders. 
There are, however, changes to this judicial process that 
should be addressed.  As stated earlier, in order for the courts to 
get involved in the redistricting process, a lawsuit must be filed that 
alleges the current legislative and congressional districts are 
unconstitutional.160  These lawsuits are very expensive and time 
consuming.161  It has been suggested that Minnesota eliminate this 
“fiction of a lawsuit” and make the appointment of a special 
redistricting panel automatic.162  This way, the “costly lawsuit that 
historically initiates and drives redistricting would be obviated.”163  
With something that occurs as consistently as redistricting, it makes 
economic and logical sense to eliminate this “faux-lawsuit” and 
institute the process automatically. 
C. If More Changes Are Needed . . . 
If a more drastic change is determined necessary, there is a 
nice framework that Minnesota can work from.  In 2009, the 
Minnesota Senate passed Senate File 182, a bill to amend the 
Minnesota Constitution and implement a bipartisan redistricting 
commission to handle Minnesota’s redistricting process.164  The bill 
 
 158.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(holding the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, President Obama’s signature health care legislation, constitutional). 
 159.  See Onvoy, Inc. v. Allete, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617–18 (Minn. 2007) (“A 
justiciable controversy exists if the claim (1) involves definite and concrete 
assertions of right that emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine 
conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is 
capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical 
facts that would form an advisory opinion.”). 
 160.  See supra Part III. 
 161.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 162.  Kalitowski & Brama, supra note 13, at 20. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  S. 182, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009), available at https://www 
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established a redistricting commission consisting of five retired 
Minnesota judges who had never served in a “party designated or 
party endorsed position,”165 with the majority and minority leaders 
of each house of the legislature choosing one member.166  These 
four members would then choose the fifth member of the 
commission.167  The bill also outlined districting principles that the 
commission had to follow.168  These principles required districts 
that did not “dilute the voting strength of racial or language 
minority populations,”169 preserved political subdivisions170 and 
communities of interest,171 were politically competitive,172 and were 
not designed to protect or defeat an incumbent.173  The 
promulgation of the final maps worked much like in Iowa, with the 
commission submitting the maps to the legislature to either 
approve or reject.174  This bill, however, was not voted on in the 
Minnesota House of Representatives before the legislative session 
ended and thus died in committee. 
 
.revisor.mn.gov/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S0182.2.html&session=ls86 (text of the bill); 
see also S. JOURNAL, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. 5773 (Minn. 2009), available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/2009-2010/20090515055.pdf#Page71 
(bill passed 39–28). 
 165.  S. 182, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. § 1. 
 169.  Id. § 1, subdiv. 6 (“The districts must not dilute the voting strength of 
racial or language minority populations.  Where a concentration of a racial or 
language minority makes it possible and it can be done in compliance with the 
other principles in this section, the districts must increase the probability that 
members of the minority will be elected.”). 
 170.  Id. § 1, subdiv. 7. 
 171.  Id. § 1, subdiv. 8 (“For purposes of this principle, ‘communities of 
interest’ include, but are not limited to, geographic areas where there are clearly 
recognizable similarities of social, political, cultural, ethnic, or economic interests, 
or that are linked by common transportation or communication.”). 
 172.  Id. § 1, subdiv. 9 (“The districts must be created to encourage political 
competitiveness . . . .”). 
 173.  Id. § 1, subdiv. 10. 
 174.  Id. § 2, subdiv. 7 (“(a) The commission shall submit to the legislature by 
April 30 of the year ending in one redistricting plans for legislative and 
congressional seats.  Either of these plans may be enacted or rejected by the 
legislature, but not modified.  (b) If a first plan submitted by the commission is 
rejected by the legislature, the commission shall submit a second plan within two 
weeks after the rejection . . . .  A second plan may be enacted or rejected by the 
legislature, but not modified. . . .  (d) If a second plan is rejected by the 
legislature, the commission shall submit a third plan within two weeks after the 
rejection . . . .  The third plan may be enacted as submitted, rejected, or enacted as 
modified by the legislature.”). 
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This bill provides a hybrid of the Iowa and Arizona system, 
using a bipartisan commission like Arizona while still leaving the 
final decision to the state legislature like in Iowa.  While it still does 
not seem that the use of a bipartisan commission needs to be 
implemented in Minnesota, especially if the aforementioned 
changes were made to the redistricting process, Senate File 182 
provides a nice framework if a complete overhaul of the system was 
required.  It places the responsibility on a panel of retired judges to 
draw the map while keeping the ultimate responsibility of 
promulgating those maps with the legislature. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Legislative and congressional redistricting is a contentious 
issue that has plagued states throughout the country ever since the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Baker v. Carr175 and Reynolds v. 
Sims,176 which mandated that congressional and legislative districts 
needed to be approximately equal in population.  Because of this 
mandate, states must reevaluate the populations of their districts 
every ten years and redraw them if they are not equal. 
Under the Minnesota Constitution, the state legislature is 
tasked with the responsibility of redrawing these districts,177 and 
therefore the same legislators that are directly affected by the new 
maps are the ones making them.  This has caused much 
controversy about whether those with a vested interest in the 
outcome should be responsible for this job.  Some states have 
recently attempted to address this problem by establishing 
independent commissions or agencies to assist with the 
redistricting process. 
While there are benefits to these commissions, their use 
effectively takes this process out of the hands of the people the 
public elected to make these kinds of difficult decisions.  While it is 
true that Minnesota’s judiciary has redistricted the state over the 
past few census cycles due to the partisanship that has plagued our 
recent political climate, this does not, however, imply that 
Minnesota’s system is broken.  Thus, rather than implementing a 
complete overhaul of Minnesota’s redistricting system and 
removing the legislature from a process that the U.S. Constitution 
 
 175.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 176.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 177.  MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
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arguably meant to be done by the state legislatures,178 Minnesota 
should strictly define the guidelines that legislators must follow 
when drawing new maps, borrowing ideas and standards that 
commissions in states such as Arizona and Iowa consider during 
their redistricting process.  By implementing politically neutral 
redistricting standards, much of the politics behind the legislative 
stalemate that generally emanates from the process can be limited.  
Allowing the legislature to set clear guidelines for the judiciary to 
follow if and when it is unable to come to a redistricting agreement 
keeps the legislature involved in the process, even when the 
responsibility of redistricting falls on the courts. 
While there will likely never be a “perfect” redistricting 
method and controversies surrounding this topic will endure so 
long as redistricting is necessary, states can take substantial steps in 
limiting the politics involved in the process.  Minnesota’s 
implementation of the aforementioned standards and guidelines 
allows for needed reforms to take place while allowing the process 




 178.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/10
